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The adoption of emergency employment and short term training programs to provide income
support to the population affected by the episodes of economic volatility since 1995 reveals the
failure of the traditional, labor law-based income support mechanisms in the region. These
emergency programs are not additional and transitory, but rather have become a permanent
component of social policies. As such, they present policymakers with the opportunity to build a
more encompassing and better designed mechanism to protect workers against the effects of
macroeconomic volatility. The paper argues for an income support system centered on
unemployment insurance, complemented with additional mechanisms to provide effective income
support to workers during normal times; the paper also discusses what changes are necessary in
emergency programs to make them work as part of that system.
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Introduction
The high level of macroeconomic volatility that has historically affected Latin American
economies has not diminished with the adoption of growth-oriented sustainable economic
policies.  Economy-wide shocks like the Tequila effect in 1995 and renewed instability since
1997 have induced governments to revisit the idea of creating mechanisms that could protect the
population from income losses.
Structural reform and macroeconomic stabilization have increased the risks that workers
face given the vulnerability of domestic production to changes in international capital and goods
markets. At the same time, the traditional legally mandated severance payment mechanisms
established in the labor laws have become irrelevant in this new environment, given the narrow
scope of their coverage.
Therefore, countries in the region did not have the option of expanding “normal” income
support programs when hit by economy-wide shocks, but had to adopt emergency responses. The
programs that resulted from these responses constitute more a mosaic of often unrelated
initiatives than a coherent and well thought out system of income support. However, the fact that
these emergency programs are in place creates an opportunity to build a more permanent system
of income support that rectifies traditional mechanisms’ shortcomings.
The question this paper attempts to address is how a more comprehensive income support
system can be built starting with those emergency programs. In other words, what is required to
transform this mosaic of programs into a coherent set of mechanisms that can provide income
support to workers both in an economy-wide shock, and in the normal process of job churning
that flexible and dynamic labor markets experience? Efforts to cope with economy-wide shocks
are doomed to failure if we do not count on mechanisms that can provide income support in the
normal course of business, and that can expand to help workers cope with economic downturns.
The paper does not attempt to extrapolate from this small and haphazard set of programs
a complete social risk management framework.  Not only would such extrapolation be
unwarranted, given the limited size and scope of the programs in place, but also social risk
management must also by necessity include programs that do not operate through the labor
market (such as subsidies for school attendance by school-age children, social investment funds,
and demand side subsidies to health service consumption, to mention just a few).
What the paper does attempt is to draw some conceptual generality from the practical
(and very real) particularities of the implementation of labor market based income support
devices in the region. By doing so, it can help policy makers to put emergency measures in the
broader and more structured framework of the long term objective of helping workers cope with
both economy-wide and idiosyncratic shocks that result in income losses and unemployment.
In the first section, we will discuss how the traditional legally mandated severance
payment system fails to work both because it covers a dwindling fraction of the population and
because it creates rigidities that hinder the ability of firms to operate in more open and contested
markets. The second section will be dedicated to a characterization of the labor market-related
income transfer programs that seven countries in the region had in place around 1995, and that
were used to attempt to mitigate the impact of the Tequila crisis on their labor markets. There we
will argue that these emergency programs were not designed in such a way as to act as counter-
cyclical devices, and in some cases created important labor market distortions. The third section6
will present a discussion of the changes needed in each of these programs to mitigate the negative
externalities they generate, and to enhance the positive ones. Finally, in the fourth section we will
present some ideas on how to develop from these emergency programs an income protection
system centered on a well-designed unemployment insurance system, complemented by
employment generation and short-term training programs to address the needs of workers who do
not have access to unemployment insurance.
The Failure of Traditional Income Support Mechanisms in Latin
America
The high level of macroeconomic volatility of Latin American economies has generated a strong
social demand for mechanisms to protect the working population from the resulting risk of
income losses. Traditionally this demand has been met by the enactment of employment security
regulations that penalize terminations either through high severance payments, when terminations
are allowed, or through direct prohibition of terminations. The region has had until the mid-1990s
high levels of employment protection, even relative to those enjoyed by workers in more
developed OECD countries (Márquez, 1997 and Inter-American Development Bank, 1997). For
workers in regulated contracts severance payments are quite high, and employment protection
regulations are strictly enforced both in practice and in courts of law.
The “social justice” rationale behind these employment security regulations is quite well
known. Firms enjoy rents that arise from high tariffs and other forms of privileged access to
financial and non-financial resources in the context of so-called “crony capitalism,” and
employment security is just one form of sharing those rents with their employees. In a sense, the
system works as privately implemented unemployment insurance with coverage limited to those
workers in a regulated employment contract. These workers are protected both because the firm
has a positive cost associated with termination (that ensures that layoffs and firings will be used
sparingly as adjustment mechanisms), and because workers who become unemployed receive an
income transfer through the payment of severance.
This pattern of employment security that protects the job but not the worker after losing
his or her job is associated with the “polarized” model of wage setting (Banuri and Amadeo,
1992). For the purpose of protecting against income volatility, this model of regulation provides
effective protection against income losses to a minority of highly organized and vocal workers,
while leaving a large fraction of the working population uncovered either in non-regulated
employment contracts or in self-employment.
In the cozy environment of a semi-closed economy this was possible because demand-
boosting government policies, however unsustainable, protected the domestic market against
external shocks. Workers who lost their jobs received severance payments and could find or
invent an alternative job in the unregulated sector of the economy. In an inflationary environment
real wages could be adjusted by raising nominal wages more slowly than the general price level.
Therefore, employment in the regulated sector was quite stable, unemployment was low, and the
adjustment variable in the labor market was the real wage.
To the extent that demand-boosting government policies deepened the misallocation of
resources resulting from protectionism and cronyism, the growth performance of the region
deteriorated during the eighties. As a consequence, employment in the regulated sector remained
stagnant and employment in non-regulated jobs without any form of protection against income
loss grew to cover almost half of the working population (see  Márquez, 1997). Therefore,7
protection against income volatility ended up covering just the fraction of the labor force
employed in the bigger and more closely regulated firms.
In the more dynamic environment that resulted from economic opening and stabilization
at the beginning of the 1990s, the relevance of this model of protection is questioned by the
increase in the pro-cyclicality and level of unemployment. What caused these changes in
unemployment? First and foremost, structural reforms and macro stabilization changed the
relative prices of capital and labor in favor of the former (Lora and Olivera, 1998). This in and of
itself increased the use of physical capital and slowed employment generation. But macro
stabilization also implied important changes in the employment behavior of the public and private
sectors.
Public sector retrenchment resulted in the displacement of workers, which increased the
stock of unemployed. More importantly and of larger consequences, the maintenance of low or
zero fiscal deficits required by fiscal discipline made it impossible for governments to act as
employers of last resort, as they had done directly or indirectly in the crisis of the eighties (Lora
and Márquez, 1998).
The reduction of inflation reduced the latitude that private (and public) employers had
enjoyed to reduce real wages through nominal wages lagging behind inflation. The increased
nominal rigidity makes employment–and not real wages–the adjusting variable in the labor
market during economic downturns. Therefore, shocks translate into higher  unemployment rather
than a collapse of real wages (Márquez and  Pagés, 1998). Once this higher level of
unemployment is reached, slower employment generation makes unemployment reduction a more
protracted and prolonged process over time (Márquez, 1998).
Graph 1: Unemployment and Growth in Latin America, 1980-1996






































Source:  Growth of GDP at constant 1990 US$ from IADB Statistical data base; unemployment data from ILO
Panorama Laboral.8
From a world where unemployment was almost absent, and where low-quality jobs in the
non-regulated sector were the crux of the problem, we jumped into a brave new world of growing
unemployment. By the end of 1998 a record number of countries in the region were experiencing
double-digit unemployment rates (Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela being the most notorious
cases) and, more troubling, unemployment remains high when the economy recuperates after
each shock (see Graph 1). Although macro and financial policies are used to limit domestic
vulnerability to external shocks, the fact remains that the recessionary environment of 1999 is
translating in most countries into more unemployment and falling wages, particularly for less
skilled workers.
But perhaps the most damaging blow to the relevance of severance payments-based
income protection has been the recognition that privately insuring workers against income losses
may hurt the ability of firms and workers to profit from the enhanced opportunities associated
with a more open and competitive economic environment. Colombia in 1990, Peru in 1991,
Nicaragua and Argentina
1 in 1995, and Venezuela in 1997 have enacted reforms of labor
regulations aimed at creating more flexible forms of employment contracts, both through the
reduction of firing costs and through the introduction of promotional contracts with lower payroll
taxes.
One of the impacts of these reforms has been a further reduction in the share of full-
benefit contracts in total employment, with a corresponding expansion of more precarious forms
of employment. The introduction of more flexible forms of employment contracts has not in fact
weakened the employment protection enjoyed by workers in the old full-benefit, full-protection
employment contracts. With relatively few exceptions, the labor reforms enacted during the
1990s have aimed at flexibilizing hiring and firing conditions at the margin, without diminishing
the legal protections enjoyed by workers already employed. Making the changes binding only on
new labor contracts has in fact grandfathered employees already on the job.  However, as the new
contractual forms have cost advantages for firms, employers have substituted workers in full-
benefit contracts by workers under the more flexible contracts. In Argentina, for instance,
promotional employment contracts generate lower payroll taxes and do not generate rights to
severance payment upon termination. According to official data
2 the number of new jobs created
under promotional contracts more than doubles the number of new full-benefit contracts, while
the opposite is true regarding the number of workers terminated under each type of contract.
In summary, as of the mid-1990s we found ourselves in a situation where unemployment
was higher and more sensitive to economic downturns, and where more than half of the employed
did not have any protection against the risk of income loss associated with unemployment.
Economic downturns may thus result in very large income losses for both the unemployed and
workers in more precarious employment contracts, and society does not offer them any formal
mechanism to insure against that risk.
The “Emergency” Income Support Mechanisms of 1995
In order to at least partially compensate for the adverse labor market effects of the Tequila effect
in 1995, governments in the region adopted and/or expanded labor market policies and programs
aimed at supporting incomes and/or expanding employment opportunities for particularly
vulnerable groups. The renewed volatility in international capital markets since the end of 1997
                                                  
1 Some of the Argentina reform measures of 1995, however, were partially reversed in 1998.
2 Encuesta de Indicadores Laborales, Min. de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, October 1998.9
has maintained the interest of policymakers in the adoption of income support programs and
suggests that these programs are more permanent than what the “emergency” label indicates.
The enactment of these programs has created an opportunity to test some new ideas and
to disseminate innovative approaches to old problems. Labor-intensive public work programs,
youth-targeted training programs, and semi-universalized unemployment insurance systems all
became acceptable ideas to help sustain the fragile political coalitions behind the economic
modernization process.
These programs were designed in a crisis context, when incomes were falling,
unemployment was increasing, and the risk of losing political support for the reform efforts was
high. Therefore, the ability of these mechanisms to expand and reach the groups at risk as fast as
possible took priority over optimal design considerations. As a consequence, we ended up with a
mosaic of programs and mechanisms that lack the coherence and size necessary to fulfill the role
of income support for wider groups of the population. In addition, these measures often introduce
labor market distortions and have difficulties adjusting counter-cyclically.
On the positive side, these programs are generally well suited to the institutional layout of
the countries and have demonstrated capability to deliver resources fast. The experience of the
region with income support programs shows that they can, at least to some extent, help to
compensate for the effects of economy-wide shocks on workers. A varied array of programs has
been used to help workers cope with one or another of the damaging effects of economy-wide
shocks.  This battery of programs will be the backbone of any income support system, given
organizational, political, and resource constraints that limit the ability of the government to create
new programs.
Given the urgency of coping with the effects of the crisis, the quest for mechanisms that
could be set up quickly to transfer income to the poor in the most targeted way possible
dominated any optimal design consideration. In a perfect world, countries would have automatic
mechanisms as unemployment insurance to protect vulnerable groups during economic shocks. In
reality, however, few countries in the region have a system of unemployment insurance and, even
in those countries, the protection of unemployment insurance is limited to a relatively small
fraction of the total workforce.
What the countries did was to put in place or expand a wide array of actions, programs,
and policies that were considered suitable as income transfer devices and that could be expanded
on short notice. Labor-intensive public works programs executed in a decentralized fashion by
sub-national governments or non-governmental (NGOs) organizations were widely used. Short-
term training program with scholarships and some form of job search assistance were also used to
provide an immediate source of income for the beneficiaries.
Public investment programs were not used as employment programs, in spite of their
important direct and indirect employment effects. Part of the reason for this was the lack of fiscal
resources to finance their execution; it was often the case that investment programs were used as
an adjustment variable in equilibrating the fiscal budget. Besides, there is no technical reason why10
(and often many why not) a large-scale investment in sanitation, for instance, should be executed
with labor-intensive technology.
3
The particular responses of different countries varied widely both in function of tradition
and history of labor market programs implementation, and in terms of the political equation that
made diverse groups more or less visible as objects of income protection. Generally speaking,
governments reacted along two main lines. Where organizational and political constraints
permitted, labor intensive public work programs were implemented. Where the perception was
that youth unemployment was a particularly important problem, training programs that targeted
unemployed youth as clientele were implemented. Some governments in the region opted for
developing both lines of action simultaneously, while some others opted for an ever-wider variety
of programs that also covered subsidization of private sector employment generation.
Unemployment Insurance
In Table 1 we present a summary description of unemployment insurance systems in the region.
As can be seen, very few countries in the region have legally and/or administratively enacted
unemployment insurance systems, and even fewer  have working unemployment insurance
schemes. This is a consequence of the very weak incentives that exist for the development of
unemployment insurance and other more socialized forms of income protection, given the fact
that severance payments work as privately provided income insurance for workers in full-benefit
employment contracts who are laid off.
In those countries that do have unemployment insurance systems, coverage is limited to
workers who have contributed while employed to the financing of the system. In other words,
only workers in full-benefit employment contracts and working in payroll tax-paying firms enjoy
the benefits of the unemployment insurance system. The level of benefits provided and their
duration is low relative to more developed countries’ unemployment insurance systems.
Replacement rates are normally in the order of 50-60% of the last wage, with caps linked to the
minimum wage for higher salaries. Benefits are granted for periods typically not longer than four
months.
                                                  
3 Another factor that probably explains this is that the redesign of investment programs to incorporate
labor-intensive technology takes a long time and requires a complete re-engineering of the investment
project, not to speak of the needed institutional redeployment.11
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Source: S.S. Programs throughout the World – 1995, US Dept. of Health and Human Services
Notes:
a. % last wage.
b. Beneficiaries receive also family support, medical and maternity benefits.
Requirements:
1 (s) – Be employed s months before receiving subsidy.
2 – Availability to work
3 – Does not receive other social security benefits.
4 (s, j ) – Not having received more than s months of benefits in the last j years.
5 – Unemployed for reasons outside the conduct and willingness of worker
6 – Subject to economic need.
7(x) – Waiting period of x days.
8 – At least 12 months between periods of receiving subsidy.
The unemployment insurance system in Argentina is quite limited in number of
beneficiaries and has remained so in spite of strong increases in the number of unemployed
workers. Mazza (2000) reports that the number of beneficiaries has remained stable at between
100 and 125 thousand workers, more than 70% of whom are prime age males, and more than
50% of whom are not household heads. She also reports that an analysis of beneficiaries in their
personal and previous job characteristics shows that there is a definite trend towards serving
younger and middle class displaced workers. This suggests that unemployment insurance is not
fulfilling a safety net role for the poor in the case of Argentina.
Brazil has the largest unemployment insurance system in the region, with between 300-
400 thousand beneficiaries. Mazza (2000) reports that unemployment insurance in Brazil is also12
serving younger (more than 50% of beneficiaries are younger than 30) and more educated (45%
of beneficiaries have completed eighth grade or higher) workers. As IPEA (1998) assesses, the
unemployment insurance system reflects wage inequality in that benefits accrue to the middle
deciles in the distribution of income.
In Venezuela, the unemployment insurance system was enacted in law in 1989, but it has
never been implemented. The system was, however, reformed in 1999. The new system will
protect beneficiaries through a mix of individual and collective insurance operated by competitive
insurance providers, but implementation has not yet begun as of this date. Given that only
workers with regulated, tax-paying contracts are entitled to benefits, it is likely that the pattern of
distribution of beneficiaries will be very similar to that of Argentina and Brazil discussed above.
Mexico and Uruguay have unemployment insurance programs operated by the social
security system. In both cases coverage is quite limited, and in the former it is just an advance
payment of old age pensions for a maximum period of five years. In the case of Barbados case,
the unemployment insurance system is very small in coverage, though quite well adapted to the
needs of an island economy with frequent but short episodes of unemployment concentrated in
workers in the tourism industry (Mazza, 2000).
Employment Generation Programs
In Table 2 we present a summary description of the employment generation that seven countries
in the region had in operation at the end of 1995. The list was extracted from a joint ILO-IADB
volume on active labor market policies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico,
and Peru.  These countries represent a wide spectrum of variation in terms of policy development,
operational capabilities, and exposure to international capital markets volatility. Program
description and characteristics were summarized in  Verdera (1998) and a more thorough
discussion of programs is presented in the national reports contained in that volume. An itemized
description of the programs is presented in Table A-1 in the Appendix.
Table 2: Employment Generation Programs in Seven Countries in the Region
Beneficiaries Expenditure
1.000s % of total
labor force
million US$ % GDP
Argentina 892.2 9.31% 249.2 0.09%
Brazil 221.8 0.49% 1,188.8 0.21%
Chile 4.3 0.10% 1.4 0.00%
Costa Rica 8.1 0.71% 3.3 0.04%
Jamaica 6.0 0.61% 21.2 0.50%
Mexico 1,024.0 4.42% 1,802.0 0.51%
Peru 27.8 0.93% 100.0 0.19%
Source: Data from Verdera 1998, modified by the author. For a complete listing, see Table in Appendix.13
Argentina is the country with the most varied set of employment generation programs,
comprising a combination of public works and subsidies to private employment. Public subsidies
to private sector employment, in the form of subsidies to firms that increase the number of
employees, were widely used under a variety of mechanisms. Workers displaced from the public
sector and unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance were given vouchers that
employers could use to pay tax liabilities. Firms could opt for tax rebates if hiring particular
groups of workers (young, women, ex-combatants, etc.) under promotional contractual forms.
Also, firms in particular activities (like reforestation) were subsidized if they hired new workers.
But the most visible mechanism of subsidization was the use of “promotional employment
contracts” established in a series of decrees in 1995. These promoted contracts were more
precarious than regular full-benefit contracts, did not originate rights to severance payments, and
produced lower payroll tax liabilities.
Argentina’s federal government also financed labor-intensive public works as an
employment generation device. The Trabajar and similar programs were financed and supervised
by the federal government using the Fondo Nacional de Empleo (a fund financed through payroll
taxes). The resources were used to build small scale and labor-intensive public works (in many
cases social infrastructure, but also roads and small sanitation works), with the works being
executed by a wide variety of agencies, ranging from local and state governments to NGOs.
The PROGER program in Brazil is a contrasting mechanism for employment generation.
The program operates through the establishment of credit lines offered through the national
development banking system to small enterprises, cooperatives, NGOs, and other civil society
associations. This mechanism serves to circumvent the sub-national governments for works
execution in order to avoid the creation of budgetary entitlements. Partial and incomplete
evaluations of  PROGER, however, are not very optimistic about the results in terms of
employment generation.
4
Chile does not have any employment generation program as such, though it has a number
of very small and narrowly targeted programs to address living conditions that may hinder the
labor market insertion of particular groups.
Costa Rica uses public works, wage subsidies, and credit to small enterprises as
mechanisms to promote employment generation. Credit to promote employment generation in
small firms is also widely used in Jamaica in a battery of programs, some of which also include a
form of short-term training. Jamaica additionally has a training and temporary employment
program for unemployed youth, aimed at easing their labor market insertion.
Mexico uses public works (rural roads and other social infrastructure) as employment
generation devices. The programs are financed by allocations from general revenues (not from
payroll taxes) in the federal government budget, and state and local governments execute the
works.
Finally, Peru uses legal incentives, a social investment fund, and a micro and small
enterprise credit program as tools for employment promotion. The labor law reform of 1991
introduced a number of more precarious forms of employment contracts, allowing firms to hire
workers without generating rights to severance payments under fixed term contracts.
                                                  
4  Relatorio  da  forca-tarefa  sobre  políticas de  emprego –  Diagnóstico e  recomendaciones, Min. do
Trabalho, Brasilia, Agosto 1998.14
FONCODES, a social investment fund, is also used as an employment generation device that can
be quickly adjusted to the situation of local labor markets. However, it is not clear how much
capacity or interest FONCODES management has in employment generation as opposed to the
physical execution of civil works (Verdera 1995).
Training as Income Transfer Program
In Table 3 we present a summary description of the training programs that were being used as
income transfer devices in seven countries in the region by the end of 1995 (Verdera,1998). An
itemized description of these programs is presented in Table A-2 in the Appendix. Training
programs were widely used as a mechanism to transfer income, particularly to unemployed youth,
through scholarships during the classroom-training period (normally three to six months) and in
some cases through job search assistance and/or apprenticeship stages in private firms. In most
cases these training programs were financed by the government and delivered by private and
NGO training providers, with little or no intervention of the traditional National Training
Institutions
The basic operational technology of these training programs was based on Chile Joven, a
pioneering youth training program that combined a scholarship for classroom training with a
three month paid apprenticeship in a private firm. Instead of direct purchasing of training
services, resources are used to create a fund that is managed by a central government agency. The
managing agency requests proposals for training projects, and funds are granted through open
bidding. The proposals must describe the content of the courses to be taught and must include a
commitment from private sector firms to accept the trainees as apprentices for a period of time
(normally three months). The provision of scholarships served as an income transfer to
beneficiaries, took them out of the unemployment queue, and gave them some labor market
experience during the apprenticeship. These three beneficial effects of the Joven program were
quite adequately suited to situations characterized by high youth unemployment rates.
5  However,
other countries in the region emulated the contracting methodology of the Joven program to cater
to the needs of other population groups.
                                                  
5 The contracting mechanism of Chile Joven was in fact a way to create incentives for training providers to
deliver good quality and labor market-relevant content of their courses. This created pressures for an
institutional and content revamping of the training system, as firms accepting apprentices acted as
controllers and gatekeepers of the relevance and adequacy of the training provided. The program was
therefore rightly perceived as a tool to modernize and connect the training system with real productive
activities.15
 Table 3: Training Programs in Seven Countries in the Region
Beneficiaries Expenditure
1.000s % of total
labor force
million US$ % GDP
Argentina 133.0 1.4% 95.6 0.04%
Brazil 740.5 1.6% 310.2 0.06%
Chile 36.6 0.8% 18.3 0.03%
Costa Rica 13.1 1.2% 60.6 0.73%
Jamaica 43.5 4.4% 18.6 0.44%
Mexico 410.3 1.8% 135 0.04%
Peru 1.5 0.1% 5.0 .01%
Source: data from Verdera 1998, modified by the author. For a complete listing, see Table in Appendix.
Among the countries in the present study, Argentina, Chile and Peru have programs
inspired by the Chile Joven design that target low-income unemployed youth. Argentina has also
used the contracting mechanisms of the Joven program to develop training programs for other
groups of the population, and granted subsidies to private employers who hire apprentices under
promotional employment contracts.
Brazil also uses competitive bidding for training provision, but the program operates in a
highly decentralized way. The PLANFOR program is financed through the FAT, a payroll tax
financed fund, and funds are allocated to state and local governments, who in turn hire different
providers (both private and public) through competitive bidding. States must present annual
training plans to the PLANFOR administration, and funds are allocated in proportion to the state’s
share of the total workforce. This method of allocation is presently being changed to reflect the
states’ levels of poverty and education and their past experience with the execution of annual
training programs. It is interesting to note that the national training institutions (in the case of
Brazil the SENAI-SENAC system) participate in the bidding process as another provider of
training services, thus creating an interesting financial and institutional dynamic in the overall
training system.
Costa Rica used instead the national training institution (INA) as a channel for delivery of
training services to semi-skilled and skilled unemployed workers. Thus, INA schedules and
delivers training programs for low income workers in marginal urban areas, for displaced public
sector workers and for handicapped workers using its own facilities and instructors. A special line
of action was established to enable INA to contract out other training institutions, but no special
targeting mechanism has been used.
Jamaica uses a number of programs to provide training for unskilled and young
unemployed workers, but the mechanism for income transfer is temporary jobs rather than
scholarships during training.16
Mexico has the largest training with income transfer program in the region, and it has
been effectively used as a protective device for unemployed and displaced workers, expanding
and contracting according to the economic cycle. The PROBECAT program provides a
scholarship for the beneficiaries, and the state offices of the Labor Ministry organize a variety of
training programs that are delivered locally. Different program evaluations have found that the
program has been somewhat successful as a training program, increasing incomes and likelihood
of employment for beneficiaries, even though positive effects tend to increase with higher levels
of education among beneficiaries.
6
Expenditure on Income Support Devices
In general terms, the seven countries in our sample invest a smaller fraction of GDP in
unemployment insurance, employment generation, and training-cum-income-transfer programs
than a wide sample of more developed OECD countries (Table 4).  On average, the countries in
our sample spend less than half a point of GDP in these programs, while the average for the
OECD countries is 2.4% of GDP. Only the US, Japan, and Greece spend a smaller fraction of
GDP on these programs than the LAC average.
Mexico is the country that spends the most resources in employment generation (one half
of a percentage point of GDP) to benefit around 4% of the total workforce, while Argentina
reports expenditure below one tenth of 1% of GDP to benefit around 9% of the total workforce.
Resources invested in training programs
7 are of the same order of magnitude as those dedicated to
employment generation programs, though the number of beneficiaries seems to be somewhat
bigger.
It is also interesting to note that countries in the region that do have unemployment
insurance systems (Brazil and Argentina) spend less on unemployment compensation than even
the less spendthrift countries in the OECD.
Table 4: Expenditure on Labor Market Programs,  OECD and Latin American








Australia (1994-95) 0.23 0.21 1.62 2.06
Austria (1995) 0.13 0.05 1.30 1.48
Belgium (1995) 0.24 0.68 2.11 3.03
Canada(1994-95) 0.29 0.07 1.50 1.86
Denmark  (1995) 0.86 0.36 3.06 4.28
Finland (1995) 0.60 0.68 3.57 4.85
France (1995) 0.67 0.40 1.43 2.50
Germany (1995) 0.44 0.44 2.08 2.96
Greece (1995) 0.04 0.09 0.44 0.57
Italy (195) 0.39 0.69 0.68 1.76
Japan (1994-95) 0.03 0.06 0.39 0.48
New Zealand (1994-95) 0.44 0.15 1.26 1.85
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Trabajo y Previsión Social, Mexico DF, Agosto 1995







Spain (1995) 0.33 0.31 2.46 3.10
Sweden (1994-95) 0.98 0.90 2.51 4.39
US (1994-95) 0.07 0.01 0.35 0.43
LAC countries
Argentina (1995) 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.27
Brazil (1995) 0.06 0.21 0.19 0.46
Chile (1995) 0.03 - - 0.03
Costa Rica (1995) 0.73 0.04 - 0.77
Jamaica (1995) 0.44 0.50 - 0.94
Mexico (1995) 0.04 0.51 n.a. 0.55
Peru (1995) 0.01 0.19 - 0.20
Notes:  Training for unemployed includes training for the unemployed adults and those at risk, plus measures for
unemployed and disadvantages youth and support of apprenticeship programs.
Employment generation includes all forms of subsidized employment, plus direct job creation by public and
non-profit sector.
Unemployment insurance includes all expenditure on benefits, independently of source of financing.
Source:  For OECD countries, Table J, ps. 211-218, Employment Outlook, June 1998, OECD.
For LAC countries, Verdera(1998).
These comparative figures suggest that there is room for expansion of the expenditure in
income support programs. Even doubling the expenditure on these programs (an increase well
beyond any reasonable expectation) would not make countries in the region big spenders in
international terms.
The Pieces of an Income Support System
The repeated bursts of economic instability during the 1990s induced governments to revisit the
idea of creating mechanisms that could protect the population from income losses. These efforts,
described in the previous section, were conceived as emergency measures aimed at transferring
resources as fast as possible to vulnerable groups of the population affected by an economy-wide
shock. Much more attention was paid to the capacity of these programs to expand rapidly than to
their ability to expand or shrink in response to demand. This trait made these programs a semi-
permanent component of social sector expenditures, therefore raising all types of questions
regarding their role in a comprehensive social policy.
One question that has been overlooked in the discussion about income support programs
is what they tell us about the failure of the established mechanisms in our societies to protect
workers (including the poor) from the effects of both economy-wide and idiosyncratic shocks.
Because of the failure of the traditional income support mechanisms (i.e., the severance payment
system) there is an absence of mechanisms to deal with the income losses associated with the
idiosyncratic shocks normal in the process of job churning. Therefore, when hit by the crisis
countries in the region did not have the option of expanding “normal” income support programs,
but had to adopt emergency responses. On the positive side, however, these emergency programs
create the opportunity to build a more permanent system of income support that rectifies the
traditional mechanisms’ shortcomings.
This system of income support should operate through the labor market, because labor is
the only asset for an overwhelming majority of the population and because most of the
transmission mechanisms of shocks operate through labor demand (Lustig and Walton, 1998).
Programs and policies that facilitate the use of labor in income earning activities will be the most18
effective to mitigate the impact of cyclical or shock-originated downturns on workers. However,
when workers fall into unemployment their consumption capacity needs to be protected (be it by
generating employment, or by providing other forms of income support) without generating a
dependency trap.
From a design point of view, these mechanisms should provide a minimum income
guarantee to all workers. To be feasible in financial and economic terms, they need to fulfill at
least three requirements:
•  Their design should not introduce labor market distortions and, in particular, should
not induce workers to reduce their search effort or increase their reservation wages.
•  Their coverage should be as wide as possible, given that the risk of unemployment
affects all workers, including those in non-regulated and precarious forms of
employment contracts.
•  Their budget allocation should be adjusted counter-cyclically, expanding in economic
downturns when unemployment increases, and contracting in expansions when it
decreases.
How well do the programs and mechanisms already in place in the region comply with
these requisites? Table 5 presents an attempt to summarize some characteristics of these programs
relative to those criteria. In the most general possible terms we find that an effective and relevant
income protection system should be a composite of programs offering different mechanisms
targeting different groups as a function of their human capital levels and labor market insertion.
Table 5: Some Criteria for Evaluation of Income Protection Programs in the Region
Program Labor market distortions Coverage Counter-cyclicality
Cash transfers Very important
Reduce incentives for labor
market  participation
Requires very thorough and
expensive targeting system
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Cash Transfers
The most immediate and direct way to protect unemployed workers’ income is through cash
transfers to families that fall below a predetermined income level. Even though the criteria for
receiving benefits from the program is formulated in terms per capita family income, low family
income levels are associated with either very low wages (Hausmann and  Székely, 1998) or
unemployment.
Cash transfer programs usually target the poorest segments of the population, who cannot
obtain a minimum survival income level in the labor market. In many cases, a cash transfer is part
of a more comprehensive program aimed at protecting and furthering the ability of low income
families to maintain and accumulate human capital and, therefore, to “graduate” from the
program.
8 Because these families are poor to begin with, economy wide or even idiosyncratic
shocks can put into question their ability to sustain minimum consumption levels. Therefore, a
cash transfer can help them smooth their consumption levels.
However, cash transfers induce very important labor market distortions, by increasing
reservation wages and creating incentives against work. Because they do not require any
counterpart work effort (making participation in the program effectively a free good), these
programs also require a very sophisticated targeting system and a complex system of verification
and enforcement, to avoid fraud by inclusion of non-needy families and to avoid exclusion of
needy ones. Cash transfers also tend to create strong entitlements among the beneficiaries,
making it extremely hard to adjust either the number of beneficiaries or the amount of benefits in
a counter-cyclical fashion.
Unemployment Insurance
Though differences in design, coverage, and benefits make it quite difficult to present an overall
assessment of the importance of unemployment insurance systems as part of a comprehensive
income support mechanism, there are some common traits that deserve comment. In the first
place, unemployment insurance is normally a benefit provided in addition to severance payments.
Once the worker is fired, he or she receives severance payments. In addition to that, the worker
has the right to unemployment insurance as a supplementary source of income during his or her
search for a new job. Therefore, income protection by the unemployment insurance system
targets workers who have had full-benefit employment contracts. As we mentioned above, this
excludes from protection a sizable fraction of the workforce that works in the unregulated
segment of the labor market, presumably those who because of their human and social capital
deficits are the neediest in terms of income protection.
In the second place, unemployment insurance systems generally lack connection with
other labor market intermediation and placement services. Even in the cases where the UI system
is operated through the Labor Ministry (as in Brazil) workers are not required to register in the
intermediation service, and payment of the benefit is not contingent on verification of search
effort. On the one hand, this lack of connection generates opportunity for fraud. Even if it is
                                                  
8 The rationale for programs as Bolsa Escola in Brazil, Programa de Asignaciones Familiares (PRAF) in
Honduras, and Beca Alimentaria en Venezuela is to avoid perpetuating a vicious circle of poverty. Thus,
these programs require keeping children in school or attending primary health care facilities during
pregnancy, as mechanisms to prevent the transmission of poverty to the next generation.20
illegal to have a job and receive UI payments simultaneously, most operators complain of their
lack of capacity to control what is perceived to be widespread fraud and collusion between firms
and workers.
9 On the other hand, this lack of connection with labor market  intermediation
services makes the system a pure income transfer that does not ease the transition of the
unemployed into a new job.
In the third place, most unemployment insurance systems are financed through payroll
taxes, which are already quite high in the region. This partly explains why coverage is limited,
replacement rates are low, and periods of coverage quite short. Any expansion of the system to
cover hitherto unprotected segments of the population is likely to face substantial opposition by
present beneficiaries and by firms operating in the regulated sector of the economy. Only in the
case of Brazil has some expansion occurred (covering traditional fishermen and workers affected
by the drought in the Northeast), but the expansion has been temporary and financed through the
use of excess funds. If unemployment insurance is to work as part of the safety net in a crisis, the
expansion of coverage would have to be produced just when the flow of benefits to already
protected workers is highest, creating financial strains on the system and the need for additional
funding. The question is whether this effort is worth doing through the unemployment insurance
system, or by creating alternative mechanism for income transfer better suited to the needs of
workers with different labor market insertions.
In the fourth place, it has been argued that the implementation of unemployment
insurance requires considerable institutional resources in terms of accounting and record keeping.
However, it should be noted that mandatory savings-based schemes in place in countries such as
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru also require considerable institutional resources of the same
type. Furthermore, pension system reforms in a number of countries in the region
10 have created a
network of institutions that hold individual workers’ accounts that can be used for record keeping
in the unemployment insurance system with little additional cost.
In conclusion, the design and target population of unemployment insurance makes it
suitable to protect workers who have full-benefit employment contracts and that acquire rights to
it through their contributions while employed. In terms of labor market distortions, the low level
of benefits and their short duration apparently do not create incentive against search. In fact, the
reports on fraud in Argentina and Brazil rather suggest that workers use unemployment insurance
as a means to obtain additional income while in a new job. As Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1999)
show,it is possible to design optimal unemployment insurance schedules that do not induce
reduction in search efforts. Furthermore, schemes of unemployment insurance based on
nominative contributions to individual accounts, which can be rolled over into retirement funds,
can minimize negative impacts on search effort. 
11
In terms of ability to expand and contract counter-cyclically, unemployment insurance
expenditure is an ideal mechanism. By definition outlays increase when unemployment is raising
and contract with the recuperation of employment.
                                                  
9 Mazza (2000) reports that some efforts have been made in Argentina to detect if workers receiving
unemployment insurance were working by using a common taxpayer identification number. It was found
that a sizable number of workers were not only working, but also contributing to social security in a new
job while continuing to receive the UI payment.
10 Most notably Chile, but also Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
11 For a proposal of an unemployment insurance system along these lines see Cortazar et al. (1995) and the
Venezuelan Social Security Law of 1997.21
The most problematic aspect of unemployment insurance, however, is related to its
coverage. Workers must bear at least part of the cost of insurance to prevent moral hazard
problems. For high productivity workers, wages are high enough to make the benefits of paying
for unemployment insurance (the expected value of benefits when unemployed) higher than the
current income foregone by paying the contribution. However, for low productivity workers the
utility gain from an increase in current income will be large enough to generate incentives to
negotiate with employers a contract without benefits in exchange for a higher current income.
Employment Generation Programs
Employment generation programs are a natural reaction of governments to increasing
unemployment. Politically they show the concern of the government with the workers’ plight and,
by providing jobs, they directly attack unemployment. For analytical purposes it is convenient to
separate labor intensive public works from wage subsidies to the private sector.
Labor-Intensive Public Works
Labor intensive public works have been the tools of choice to deal with economy-wide shocks.
The number and variety of programs in place in the region shows that governments choose to
spend more additional resources in employment generation than in other mechanisms to provide
income support to unemployed workers. One of the main advantages of these programs is that
they are self-targeted (Grosh 1994, Ravallion 1998) and, therefore, can be implemented without
the delays involved in implementing a targeting mechanism.
Three characteristics of labor-intensive public works are crucial in their success as
income support mechanisms. In the first place, these programs are financed by the central
government and executed by local organizations (be it local governments or  NGOs), who
normally are in charge of selecting the works to be performed and the selection of beneficiaries.
Thus, labor intensive public works require an extensive and solid network of institutions at the
local level, with the technical and operational capacity to choose the works to be done, to
organize the production process, and to channel resources to the needy poor. A large part of the
success of these programs hinges on how well structured the relationship is between the central
government and the executing agencies.
There is not a single way of designing this relationship. To mention just two examples,
Argentina chose to finance works that are approved by a central government agency and executed
mostly by local governments, while Brazil chose to allocate resources semi-automatically on a
regional needs basis and have works selected by the sub-national governments. In any case, what
is important is that the design of the relationship between financing and work execution be
adequate to the institutional and political structure of the country. More federalist countries
should respect local autonomy in work selection and allocate budgets on objective criteria, while
more centralized countries will be more able to select works and distribute resources at the central
level while keeping responsibility for execution at the local level.
In the second place, the wage level and the criteria for selection of beneficiaries are set at
the central level, while local organizations are in charge of the selection of beneficiaries. Thus,
there is a certain degree of tension between the criteria set at the central level and the local
political and social reality within which the selection of beneficiaries take place. There are
multiple ways to solve, or at least mitigate, the consequences of this tension. Community
participation is useful for oversight to ensure that resources are not diverted through political
favoritism or other forms of corruption, but there is no guarantee that the needed level of22
community participation will exist. A useful complement to community participation is a system
of random sampling of projects and beneficiaries by the central government agency in charge of
overseeing the program to check whether or not resources are being diverted. This implies a non-
trivial investment of resources in sampling and supervision, but these resources will pay for
themselves in more transparency and better targeting of beneficiaries.
In the third place, the virtue of self-targeting has the vice of low wages. In order to
concentrate resources on needy groups and avoid inducing distortions in local labor markets,
wages in labor intensive public works are frequently set below the market wage of the relevant
labor market. The literature on “workfare” in the developed world suggests that this targeting
mechanism is not without costs in terms of stigmatizing workers who participate in the program
(Lightman, 1995), and in terms of political and social discrimination among workers by program
administrators (Rose, 1994). There is no solution to this problem, short of raising wages to market
levels, which in most cases will be impossible given resource constraints.
In summary, labor intensive public works do not generate important labor market
distortions to the extent that they offer wages below the relevant market, and can provide a source
of income to workers temporarily unemployed. Their coverage depends on the amount of
resources allocated to the program, but there is no intrinsic reason why coverage of low skill
workers could not be as ample as needed to reduce unemployment to the target level. This same
property, however, brings us to the problem of their counter-cyclicality. Because the amount of
resources dedicated to the program is a political decision, there is no way of guaranteeing that the
program will move in sync with the economic cycle, expanding in downturns and shrinking in
upturns. In fact, the experience in the region shows that once programs are in place it is very
difficult to reduce their size. In the well known cases of programs that were phased out during the
eighties (PEM and POJ in Chile and PAIT in Peru), the closing seems to have been mostly a
reaction to widespread problems of design and political manipulation.
Wage Subsidies
The experience of subsidizing private sector jobs is much less widespread than labor-intensive
public works programs. Argentina is the only case where wage subsidies were widely used, and
even there the scope of these programs has shrunk recently due to criticisms from the union
movement.
Wage subsidies work through reducing the payroll tax and/or severance payments in
employment contracts for particular groups of workers (youth, women, ex-combatants, etc.). This
characteristic makes them suitable for the introduction of more flexible (or precarious)
employment contracts in a process of labor market regulation reform. In fact, this was the role
these programs fulfilled in Argentina in 1995. But at the same time, this makes them the center of
a political debate on labor market flexibilization, which in large measure explains why these
programs were phased out as a result of union opposition in 1998.
On the other hand, because wage subsidies target particular groups, they change the
relative prices of different types of workers in favor of the target group and induce large labor
market distortions, not the least of which is the substitution of subsidized by non-subsidized
workers.
12 In order to mitigate this problem, there is normally an “additionality” requirement, by
                                                  
12 More formally, deadweight effects appear when the subsidized jobs would have been created anyway
without the subsidy, while substitution effects appear when subsidized workers replace non-subsidized23
which subsidies are granted only for new net hires that expand the payroll. In turn, this requires
the determination of a baseline number of employees and a control on new hires. Theoretically
this is a task that Ministries of Labor fulfill in the normal course of their operations. In practice,
the ministries are extremely weak and have a very low enforcement capability. This weakness
makes impossible the task of determining baselines and controlling hires of subsidized workers,
thereby making worker substitution a widespread problem. As a consequence, it is not clear
whether these programs really create more jobs than would have been created without the
subsidy.
In summary, these programs tend to generate large and important labor market distortions
by attempting to change the relative salaries of different types of workers. Because wage
subsidies have to be explicitly targeted by design, they require a comprehensive and often non-
existent enforcement apparatus, making the problem of targeting the program an intractable one.
In terms of their counter-cyclicality, expanding and shrinking the program requires an
administrative decision. To the extent that these programs are often perceived as a mechanism to
introduce more flexible (or more precarious) employment contracts, they can become the center
of an often ardent political debate and make decisions about program implementation politically
very costly. This has been the experience of Argentina, where these programs were phased out at
the same time that more far reaching labor regulation reforms were rejected during 1997.
Short-Term Training Programs
Short-term training programs work as an income support device through the provision of
scholarships to trainees during the classroom training and apprenticeship periods, normally
between four and six months. The scholarships are below the relevant market wage, and the
apprenticeships are developed in private firms with which the training providers sign an
agreement. The short duration of the classroom training makes these programs better suited for
providing young new entrants to the labor market with job search skills than meeting the needs of
workers displaced from declining sectors for skill updating or upgrading.
The main challenge in the design of these training programs arises from the existence of a
national training institution, normally a monopolistic public provider of training financed through
a payroll tax with no incentive whatsoever to adapt the nature of its activities and clientele to the
challenges of high unemployment. In order to circumvent this obstacle the programs are
organized through the setting up of a separate pool of resources managed by a specialized agent at
the central government level. This agent in turn bids out resources to private providers that
execute the training programs in a decentralized fashion. As we mentioned, these decentralized
providers must enter into agreements with private sector firms to ensure that trainees will have an
apprenticeship stage, making private firms the effective gatekeepers of the quality and relevance
of the training programs. Another interesting byproduct of this process is the development of
stronger connections between firms and training providers, which make the latter effectively
providers of job search assistance services.
Training programs tend to be more expensive on a per beneficiary basis than labor-
intensive public works, given that a larger part of the resources goes to pay the training provider.
However, calculations of benefits should include the long-term change in the structure of the
                                                                                                                                                      
(Calmfors, 1994). The additionality requirement address the deadweight effect, while substitution effects
are only prevented at the margin.24
training system and the development of job search assistance services, which are very large
positive externalities of these programs.
13
The organization of the programs makes it easy for the program organizer to
administratively target groups of the population, and the programs have been quite successful in
attracting unemployed youth. However, it should be noted that the programs can be too effective
in attracting the target group: in Mexico in 1996 youth participation rates increased so much that
even if the employment rate of the group rose, so did its unemployment rate. Although there is no
formal proof that this was the result of the expansion of training programs (particularly
PROBECAT) in that year, there is a suggestive association between expansion of these programs,
decline in school enrollment rates, and increase in labor force participation and employment of
the target groups.
In summary, these programs tend to generate positive labor market externalities beyond
the training process itself by easing the insertion of young workers and creating experience in the
operation of labor market  intermediation mechanisms (job search assistance). In terms of
coverage, the nature of the training provided makes them suitable for unemployed youth and, as
with any training program, one should not expect them to create new jobs but rather to provide
new entrants with some labor market experience. Because youth unemployment is a permanent
problem in the labor market, one should not think of these programs as counter-cyclical devices,
but rather as permanent features of a well-functioning labor market intermediation system, that
could be expanded and contracted following demand in a counter-cyclical way.
Putting the Pieces Together
Macroeconomic volatility seems to be a permanent feature of Latin American economies, and the
adoption of growth-oriented sustainable economic policies has not reduced it. In the brave new
world of higher and more pro-cyclical unemployment, the traditional legally mandated severance
payment mechanisms have failed to provide the income support needed by unemployed and
displaced workers. These traditional mechanisms have become irrelevant in the new environment
of more open and competitive economies, given the narrow scope of their coverage. This same
failure has led governments, faced with sharp economic instability since 1995, to develop a series
of attempts at setting up mechanisms to support the incomes of groups of the population hurt by
unemployment and declining incomes.
The pieces of the new income support system are there in most countries. However,
because they were developed as emergency programs, they are more a mosaic of often unrelated
initiatives than a coherent and well thought out system. As such, their ability to expand rapidly
was a dominant concern. Little attention was paid to the potential labor market distortions they
introduced, and even less to their ability to expand and contract in a counter-cyclical fashion.
Moreover, the scarcity of resources available at the moment of their implementation called for
narrow targeting of the poor, as the programs were thought of as emergency devices to protect the
population that did not have the resources to protect themselves. The underlying thought was that
                                                  
13 These emergency training programs have created the opportunity to introduce institutional innovation
into a training system characterized by the monopolistic power of payroll tax financed institutions.
Disseminating these innovations to the mainstream vocational training system will make it much more
successful in addressing the needs of skill upgrading of workers caught in the normal process of job
churning.25
the traditional income support mechanism based on severance payments served to protect the
non-poor.
The starting point for a new income support system is the recognition that workers in
general, and not only the poor, need to count on mechanisms to help them cope with both
economy-wide and idiosyncratic shocks that result in income losses and unemployment. The
protection of the severance payment system covers today no more than half the labor force and
has a high cost in terms of labor market distortions. As has been argued extensively elsewhere
(e.g., Inter-American Development Bank, 1997) more socialized forms of income protection,
such as unemployment insurance, can provide effective protection and cost less in terms of labor
market distortions. In this sense, some of the recent labor market reforms (exemplified by the
Venezuelan reform of 1997), which reduce legally mandated severance payments and create a
system of unemployment insurance, represent a step in the right direction.
However, coverage of unemployment insurance will not be wide enough to protect all
workers, particularly the poorer ones. Part of what differentiates the poor from the non-poor is the
nature of their labor market insertion and, therefore, the mechanisms that need to be devised to
insure them against the risk of income loss. Poorer, low productivity workers must rely on
alternative mechanisms to protect themselves as they cannot afford the cost of unemployment
insurance, or are in employment situations (self-employment or casual work in unregulated
contracts) that make unemployment insurance unsuitable. For those workers, a menu of
alternatives needs to be provided based on the existing mechanisms on income support.
Table 6: The Design of an Income support system
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A very general vision of the components of an income support system is presented in
Table 6. At the center of the scheme, a well-designed unemployment insurance system covers the
group of workers that, given their employment contracts and their productivity, can “buy” the
insurance. Both individual accounts and collective insurance are needed in order to prevent moral
hazard and to extend as much as possible the coverage of the system. The rationale for the
implementation of the collective insurance component is that workers who suffer more frequent
or more prolonged unemployment episodes can “borrow” against future deposits. The Chilean
Ministry of Labor proposed a good example of this type of unemployment insurance in 1993 (see
Cortazar  et al., 1995), and the recent reform of the social security system in Venezuela
contemplates an unemployment insurance system along the same lines.
Mandatory-savings based schemes (the so-called “separation funds” in Brazil, Colombia,
Peru, and Venezuela) mimic a number of the desirable characteristics of unemployment insurance
and can serve as an alternative basis for protecting the income of workers in regulated
employment relations.
For workers who do not have access to unemployment insurance a variety of mechanisms
need to be put in place, depending on the reasons for these workers’ lack of access. In the first
place, short-term training courses could provide low skill new entrants with the training, labor
market experience, and job search assistance necessary to access a regular job. Scholarships
should be set at a level low enough as to not discourage search in the local labor market, 
14 and
targeting should concentrate resources on out-of-school unemployed youth. Careful attention
should be given to attract exclusively individuals out of the school system, and therefore to deter
school desertion pulled by the program. Financing of this program should be obtained from the
existing payroll tax earmarked for training, maintaining the system of decentralized provision
with apprenticeships. Funding should be provided in sync with demand for these services, higher
during economic downturns and lower during expansions. However, to the extent that the training
system unifies around the decentralized model of provision, a continuous level of funding should
be provided to help all workers deal with normal job churning, while the youth component adjusts
to the economic cycle as a function of the evolution of the youth unemployment rate.
For displaced low skill workers, labor-intensive public works are the tools of choice in
order to provide them with jobs at the local level. As we mentioned above, in the design of these
programs it will be necessary to take into account the level of development of local governments,
and the nature of their financial and political relationship with the central government. Many
initiatives to set up employment generation programs have failed for not taking into account the
organizational and political dimension of the separation between financing and execution. Again,
wage levels in the programs should be low enough so as not to crowd out alternative employment
opportunities. Funding should be provided from general revenues and not, as is normally done,
from payroll tax revenue.
15 Again, funding should be provided in sync with demand, with
expenditure adjusting according to the evolution of the general or, if available, local
unemployment rates.
The other member of the family of employment generation programs, wage subsidies,
should be used sparingly if at all, in spite of the conceptual attractive of the idea of generating
                                                  
14 The main criteria here is that the scholarship should be below the market wage that equivalent workers
obtain in the labor market, and not in function of the overall average wage.
15 The use of payroll tax resources (which increase the cost of labor and therefore reduce employment
generation) to generate jobs is somewhat contradictory in terms.27
private sector “real” jobs (as opposed to the “make work” jobs of labor-intensive public works).
The distortions caused by meddling with the relative wages of different types of workers are
important enough to recommend caution in this area. Besides, the sophisticated enforcement and
supervision system needed to mitigate the deadweight and substitution effects of these subsidies
is not present in most of countries.
Finally, cash transfers to poor families are the last resort mechanism to support those
families that “fall through” the other support mechanisms. As a mechanism of last resort a signal
of good implementation is low coverage. If coverage rises to a well-defined poverty head count
there is a clear signal that other components of the income support system are failing, and too
many workers are “falling through.” The complication of their design and implementation are
well known,
16 and extreme caution is recommended given that the program can create
dependency traps for beneficiaries.
This set of programs and  mechanisms, centered on unemployment insurance and
encompassing other complementary mechanisms to protect more vulnerable workers, is a quite
comprehensive system of income support. As such, the system as described is more a statement
of purpose than a guide for action. Political realities and implementation abilities will determine
what part of a labor market-based income protection system can be implemented in a given
country at a given time. As a vision of purpose it could be useful to put emergency measures into
a more structured framework of long term objectives. Most of the components of this
comprehensive system exist in one form or another in most countries in the region. Setting some
of them (as replacing legally mandated severance payments by unemployment insurance or
saving-based separation funds) will require far-reaching political agreements, but these
agreements can only be facilitated by sharing a vision of the end product as a system to protect all
workers against income volatility. In other cases (as in designing emergency employment
programs) the pitfalls of designing in the context of an emergency can be to some extent
mitigated by a vision of how the emergency program will fit in the context of a new and more
effective income protection system.
                                                  
16 For a summary of state-of-the-art arguments on cash transfers see Family Allowances Program, Phase II,
Loan Proposal (HO-0132), IADB, Project Report 2354.28
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 Table A-1: Employment Generation Programs in Seven Countries in the Region
Beneficiaries Expenditure
1,000s % of total
labor force
10
6 US$ % GDP
Argentina 9.31% 0.09%
Public works financed with public resources
1. Programa de Asistencia Solidaria (PROAS)
Unemployed household heads in public works executed jointly
by Sec. Desarrollo Social and state governments
          260.0 2.7%             54.5 0.020%
2. Programa de Entrenamiento Ocupacional (PRENO) 94.0 1.0%             20.0 0.007%
3. Programa de Servicio Comunitario (ASISTIR)
Female household heads in community development activities
            25.0 0.3%               2.6 0.001%
4. Programa Trabajar
Unemployed household heads in public works executed by local
governments and NGOs.
          233.0 2.4%             44.9 0.017%
Private sector employment promotion
5. Programa de Empleo Privado para Pequeñas y Medianas
Empresas
Subsidy for new jobs for unemployed workers in firms with less
than 100 employees
          254.0 2.7%             42.4 0.016%
6.  Programa  Nacional de  Forestación  Intensiva
(FORESTAR)
Subsidy for new jobs for unemployed workers in new
agricultural/forestry firms.
            21.0 0.2%               4.4 0.002%
7. Programa de Reinserción Laboral
Subsidy to workers that find a job while receiving
unemployment insurance.
 n.a.  n.a.
8. Programa de Movilidad Geográfica
Subsidy to workers that have to move from place of residence to
keep the job.
 n.a.  n.a.
9. Bono para la creación de empleo privado (BOCEP)
Fiscal credit for workers displaced from states’ payroll. New
employer can use as collateral for credit from public banks.
              5.2 0.1%             73.4 0.027%
Brazil (1)           221.8 0.49%        1,188.8 0.21%
1. Programa de Generación de Empleo e Ingresos (PROGER)
Special credit lines to MSMEs, cooperatives and informal sector.
          221.8 0.5%        1,188.8 0.21%
Chile               4.3 0.10%               1.4 0.00%
1. Trabajadoras temporeras
Child-care and educational services for children of  ag.
Temporary workers
              4.3 0.1%               1.2 0.002%
2. Programa de desarrollo del microempresario indígena
Strengthening of economic networks of indigenous groups
through ME creation and support
 n.a.               0.2
Costa Rica               8.1 0.71%               3.3 0.04%
1. Programa nacional de generación de empleo
Transfer of a min. wage to unemployed workers who participate
in construction of social services infrastructure and service
delivery.
              2.1 0.2%               0.1 0.001%
2. Pro Trabajo
- Incentivos para la reinserción laboral y el empleo temporal
Subsidy of 50% of min. wage for on-the-job-training for
unemployed/vulnerable workers.
              3.4 0.3%               2.1 0.026%
- Ideas productivas
Support to ME creation.
              2.6 0.2%               1.1 0.013%31
Table A-1, continued
Jamaica               6.0 0.61%             21.2 0.50%
1. Micro Investment Development Agency (MIDA)
Credit for ME development
              6.0 0.6%              7.6 0.181%
2.  The Government of Jamaica/Government of the
Netherlands Micro Enterprise Project (GoJ/GoN MEP)
Credit for ME development
 n.a. 0.000%
3. The Government of Jamaica/European Union Programme
Credit for ME development
 n.a.               1.4 0.034%
4.  Mel Nathan Institute for Development and Social
Research (MMI)
Community development services
 n.a.               1.6 0.038%
5. Enterprise Development Trust (EDT)
Credit for ME development
              0.0 0.0%               0.2 0.004%
6. The Women’s Construction Collective (WCC)
Training and credit for female construction workers
 n.a.  n.a.
7. ASSIST Ltd.
Credit for ME development
 n.a.               0.1 0.002%
8. Bee Keeping and Honey Bee Project
Training and employment for youth in bee-keeping activities.
 n.a.               0.3 0.007%
9. SESP
Training and temporary employment for unemployed workers
 n.a.             10.0 0.237%
Mexico        1,024.0 4.42%        1,802.0 0.51%
2. Programa de Conservación de Caminos Rurales
Rural public works for unemployed youth, Federal Govt.
financed, works organized by state and local governments.
          712.0 3.1%           350.0 0.099%
3. Progr. de Construcción de Infraestructura Física y Obras
de Empleo Productivo
Social infrastructure public works for unemployed youth,
Federal Govt. financed, works organized by State and local
governments.
          312.0 1.3%        1,452.0 0.410%
4. Programas Sociales Privados Club de Leones y Rotarios  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Peru (2)              27.8 0.93%               0.1 0.19%
1. Progr. de autoempleo y microempresa (PRODAME)
Training and credit for ME creation and support
              4.2 0.1%               0.1 0.000%
1.  FONCODES
Social investment fund builds small public works using local
work-orce.
23.6 0.8% 100.0 0.002%
(1) PROEMPREGO is excluded from the Brazilian list of employment generation programs, as it is an investment
program, with obvious employment consequences, but with the primary objective of improvements in sanitation,
environmental infrastructure, urban transport, etc. through BNDES lines of credit.
(2) Peru has also implemented a number of its employment generation programs as labor intensive investments sub-
projects, complementary to the normal investment activities of institutions such as Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo
(INADE), Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria (PRONAA),  Empresa Nacional de Edificaciones (ENACE),
Fondo  Nacional de la  Vivienda (FONAVI),  Instituto  Nacional de  Infraestructura  Educativa y de Salud (INFES),
SEDAPAL, CORDECALLAO, CORDELIMA, INABIF,  Fondo de  Compensación Municipal, PROMANACHCS
(Min. Agricultura), Ministerio de Transporte.32
Table A-2: Training Programs in Seven Countries in the Region
Beneficiaries Expenditure
1,000s % of total
labor force
10
6 US$ % GDP
Argentina 133.0 1.4% 95.6 0.04%
1. Proyecto Joven
Scholarships and stage in temporary job for low-income,
unskilled, unemployed youth.
53.0 0.6% 71.7 0.027%
2. Proyecto de Microemprendimiento
Entrepreneurship training for experienced, unskilled
workers
5.4 0.1% 6.5 0.002%
3. Programa Imagen (Orientación para el empleo)
Job-search assistance
27.0 0.3% 1.2 0.000%
4. Programa de Talleres Ocupacionales (PTO)
Support to NGOs in setting up training institutions
18.0 0.2% 4.2 0.002%
5. Programa de Capacitación Ocupacional
Training of unemployed and SMEs personnel
24.0 0.3% 7.3 0.003%
6. Programa de Capacitación para el Empleo
Scholarships and stage in temporary job for low-income,
unskilled, unemployed and displaced workers
1.7 0.0% 2.3 0.001%
7. Programa Aprender
Financing of health and accident insurance for young
workers hired under Contratos de Aprendizaje
1.9 0.0% -
8. Programa Emprender
Financing of training cost for workers in new firms.
2.0 0.0% 2.4 0.001%
9. Programa de Crédito Fiscal
Tax exception for training firms.
n.a. n.a.
Brazil 740.5 1.6% 310.2 0.06%
PLANFOR
FAT-financed training program executed at the federal and
state level by independent training institutions.
1. Programas Federales y Estatales
Federal and state programs for vulnerable groups.
340.8 0.7% 149.8 0.03%
2. Programas de Emergencia
Emergencies from drought and declining/restructuring
sectors
399.7 0.9% 159.4 0.03%
Chile 36.6 0.8% 18.3 0.03%
1. Programa Chile joven
Stipend and stage in temporary job for low-income, non-
skilled, unemployed youth.
17.9 0.4% 10.4 0.019%
2.  Programa de  apoyo a  mujeres  jefas de  hogar de
escasos recursos
Training, day-care, health and other services to improve
labor market insertion of poor women
15.0 0.3% 4.9 0.009%
3.  Mujer y  microempresa (Capacitación en  gestión
empresarial con perspectiva de género)
Entrepreneurship training for female household heads with
some education
0.1 0.0% 0.3 0.001%
4. Programa de reinserción laboral
Job search and relocation assistance to displaced workers
from carbon and textile workers.
0.2 0.0% 0.8 0.002%
5. Programas regulares de becas
Scholarships for training at official institutions for
vulnerable groups (temporary workers in agriculture, ports
and fishing)






1,000s % of total
labor force
10
6 US$ % GDP
Chile, continued
7.  Programa de  capacitación e  inserción  laboral  para
personas con discapacidad
0.6 0.0% 0.9 0.002%
8. Programa de rehabilitación, capacitación e inserción
laboral para personas discapacitadas
0.2 0.0% 0.1 0.000%
9.  Programa de  formación y  capacitación  para  el
trabajo.
Adult training program privately operated.
1.2 0.0% 0.4 0.001%
Costa Rica 13.1 1.2% 60.6 0.73%
3.  Llave en mano
Contracting out of training activities by the public training
institution (INA)
n.a. n.a.
5. Formación y reconversión para los movilizados
Training for displaced public sector workers
1.5 0.1% n.a.
6. Talleres públicos
Training of low-income workers in marginal urban areas
6.2 0.6% n.a.
7. Formación profesional para el desarrollo socio laboral
de personas con discapacidad
Training of handicapped workers
1.0 0.1% n.a.
8.  Prog. de  becas de  capacitación  para  el  empleo  del
Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social
Scholarships for training of workers with secondary
education.
4.4 0.4% 0.1
Jamaica 43.5 4.4% 18.6 0.44%
1. Skills 2000
Training for out-of-school and unskilled unemployed
workers
40.0 4.1% 11.4 0.3%
2. Special Training Empowerment Programme (STEP)
Youth training
0.6 0.1% 4.6 0.1%




4. National Youth Service (NYS)
Training temporary employment for unemployed youth
2.9 0.3% 2.6 0.06%
Mexico 410.3 1.8% 135 0.04%
1.  Programa de  Becas de  Capacitación  para
Desempleados (PROBECAT)
Training and scholarships for unemployed workers
410.3 1.8% 135 0.038%
Peru 1.5 0.1% 5.0 0.01%
1.  Programa de  Capacitación  Laboral  Juvenil
(PROJOVEN)
Scholarships and training for unemployed youth
1.5 0.1% 5.0 0.01%